NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 23 | Number 4

Article 8

6-1-1945

Res Ipsa Loquitur -- Application to Electric Eye
Doors
James G. Hudson Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
James G. Hudson Jr., Res Ipsa Loquitur -- Application to Electric Eye Doors, 23 N.C. L. Rev. 376 (1945).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol23/iss4/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

376

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application to Electric Eye Doors
The recent North Carolina case of Watkins v. Taylor Furnishing
Co., Inc.,1 held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply where
a customer was injured by a "magic eye" door in defendant's store.
Plaintiff entered through the left side of the double door opening, the
door, being partially open, suddenly closed catching the plaintiff between
it and the door frame. The applicability of res ipsa loquitur to injuries sustained by customers in stores is raised by this case and the
following discussion will be limited to such problem.
A storekeeper owes an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition for the
protection of business visitors. 2 In the absence of the proprietor's
actual knowledge of the alleged defect, it must appear that he was constructively notified of its presence, i.e., that it existed for such a time
before the accident as to have become apparent if reasonable care had
been exercised in inspecting the premises.8 Such a failure to inspect,
or a failure to repair discoverable defects, constitutes negligence. On
the other hand, the defendant storekeeper is not the insurer of the safety
4
of those who enter his store for the purpose of making purchases.
As prerequisite to the invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
the courts have established the following rules: (1) The instrumentality producing harm must be such that in the ordinary course of events
no injury would result unless from a negligent construction or user.5
(2) The apparatus must have been in the control and/or management
of the party charged with neglect at the time of the injury., It has
been held that this refers to the right of control, rather than actual
control, at the time of the negligence complained of. 7 Thus the mere
1224 N. C. 674, 31 S. E. (2d) 917 (1944).
'Todd v. S. S. Kresge Co., 303 Ill. App. 89, 24 N. E. (2d) 899 (1940) ; Sherlock v. Strouss-Hirshberg Co., 132 Ohio St. 35, 4 N. E. (2d) 912 (1936).
Rankin v. Brandies & Sons. 135 Neb. 86. 280 N. W. 260 (1938); Pratt v.
Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 218 N. C. 732. 12 S. E. (2d) 242 (1940).
'Hulett v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 299 Mich. 59, 299 N. W. 807 (1941);
Pratt v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 218 N. C. 732, 12 S. E. (2d) 242 (1940);
Fox v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 209 N. C. 115. 182 S. E. 662 (1935) ; Sherlock
v. Strouss-Hirshberg Co., 132 Ohio St. 35. 4 N. E. (2d) 912 (1936).
'John v. McGinnis Co., 37 Cal. App. 176, 99 P. (2d) 323 (1940); Wiedanz
v. May Dept. Store Co., Mo. App. - , 156 S. W. (2d) 44 (1941) ; Springs
v. Doll, 197 N. C. 240, 148 S. E. 251 (1929) ; Sherlock v. Strouss-Hirshberg Co.,
132 Ohio St. 35, 4 N. E. (2d) 912 (1936); Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 52 R. I. 151,
158 Atl. 720 (1932).
' Olson v. Swan, 203 Cal. 206, 263 Pac. 518, 58 A. L. R. 129 (1928); Home
Public Market v. Newrock, 111 Colo. 428, 142 P. (2d) 272 (1943) ; Todd v. S. S.
Kresge Co., 303 Ill. App. 89, 24 N. E. (2d) 899 (1940) ; Nichols v. Korbritz, 139
Me. 256, 29 A. (2d) 161 (1942) ; Wiedanz v. May Dept. Store Co., Mo. App.
, 156 S. W. (2d) 44 (1941); Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C. 240, 148 S. E. 251
(1929); Benjamin v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 62 Ohio App. 83, 23 N. E. (2d) 447

(1939); Sherlock v. Strouss-Hirshberg Co., 132 Ohio St. 35, 4 N. E. (2d) 912
(1936).
'Hart v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 233 Mo. App. 312, 118 S. W.
(2d) 509 (1938).
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possibility that some third person might have been responsible for the
negligent condition does not prevent the rule from applying, because
the doctrine is founded on probabilities, not mere possibilities.s In most
of the cases both of these requisites are present, but courts apply the
doctrine when only one is found to exist. In combination with one or
both of these conditions is found a third explanation for the application
of res ipsa loquitur: That the defendant possesses superior knowledge
or means of information as to the cause of the occurrence than does
the plaintiff.'
The doctrine is not a substantive rule of law; rather, it is a rule of
evidence, permitting the jury, in most jurisdictions, to draw an inference of negligence, which the defendant is always entitled to negative,
and if he fails to do so takes the risk of an adverse verdict.10 If two
reasonable inferences are deducible from the same facts, one of which
points to the negligence of the defendant and another to a different
cause, the doctrine is inapplicable, else, it is said, "a jury is called upon
to enter the field of speculation."-"
The courts agree that the mere fact of an invitee falling on the floor
of a store does not of itself raise the inferenc6 of negligence on the
part of the storekeeper. 2* To recover in such instance the injured
party must prove by competent evidence some actionable negligence of
8Ibid.
Cal. App.
'Takashi Kataoka et at. v. May Dept. Store Co., et al., Mo. App.
139 P. (2d) 25 (1943); Wiedanz v. May Dept. Store Co., 156 S.W. (2d) 44 (1941).
10 Galbraith v. Smith, 120 N. J. L. 515, 1 A. (2d)
34 (1938); Sherlock v.
Strouss-Hirshberg Co., 132 Ohio St. 35, 4 N. E. (2d) 912 (1936).
" Farina v. First Nat. Bk., 72 Ohio App. 109, 51 N. E. (2d) 36 (1943) (The
doctrine only applies when the facts admit of a single inference-that the accident
would not have happened unless the defendant had been negligent).
12* F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Ney, 239 Ala. 233, 194 So. 667 (1940)
(Plaintiff
slipped on banana peel in aisle of store. Held: The Plaintiff is under the primary duty to show that the injury was proximately caused by the negligence of
the storekeeper, or one of its servants or employees.) ; Dalton v. Steiden Stores,
Inc., 277 Ky. 179, 126 S.W. (2d) 155 (1939) (Plaintiff stumbled over weather
stripping and fell. Held: Must show that defect could have been discovered by
reasonable inspection.) ; Hulett v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 299 Mich. 59, 299
N. W. 807 (1941) (Plaintiff slipped on oily floor. Held: To establish liability
there must be evidence that the floor was improperly oiled.) ; Rankin v. Brandies
& Sons, 135 Neb. 70, 280 N. W. 260 (1938) (Plaintiff slipped on soapy substance
on floor. Held: This raises no presumption of negligence, but what constitutes
due care of the storekeeper should be determined from the surrounding circumstances.); Pratt v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 218 N. C. 732, 12 S. E. (2d)
242 (1940) (Plaintiff slipped on greasy floor. Held: Defendant was not insurer of
safety of those who entered the store and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not
applicable.); Fox v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 209 N. C. 115, 182 S. E. 662
(1935) (Plaintiff slipped when she stepped on beet lying on the floor. Held:
Must establish actionable negligence of the defendant.) ; Parker v. Great Ati. &
Pac. Tea Co., 201 N. C. 691, 161 S. E. 209 (1931) (oily floor); Bowden v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 198 N. C. 559, 152 S. E. 625 (1930) (oily floor) ; Reay v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 154 Pa. Super. 119, 35 A. (2d) 558 (1944) (oily
floor) ; Martin v. Miller Bros. Co., 26 Tenn. App. 110, 168 S. W. (2d) 187 (1942).
For further collection of authorities on this point see Notes (1919) 5 A. L. R.
282, (1924) 33 A. L. R. 181, 197.
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the defendant.'
Nor was the rule allowed to be extended to cover a
case where the plaintiff stumbled over a plainly visible scale platform
as she was leaving defendant's store,' 4 or where plaintiff, busily engrossed in conversation with another lady, stumbled over a stool in the
store's aisle,'5 * or where plaintiff was run into by a small boy on a tricycle, the store having tricycles for sale. 16* Also refusing to allow the
doctrine to be availed of where defendant's control is lacking, the California court in Bartholomai v. Owl Drug Co. et al. said: "The mere
fact that the fire occurred is insufficient to raise an inference of negligence on the part of defendants."' 7 In that case defendant was having
some welding done by a contractor and fire broke out causing plaintiff's
injuries.
There has been, however, some difference of opinion in applying the
doctrine to those cases where a chair in which the customer is sitting
suddenly collapses. In Kilgore v. Shepard Co.'3 it appeared that a leg
of the chair in which plaintiff sat was out of its socket and suddenly
collapsed. The Rhode Island court ruled that res ipsa loquitur did not
apply, saying that the control over the chair had been assumed by the
plaintiff."1* But the Missouri 20 and Texas 21 courts have repudiated
the doctrine of the Kilgore case. Thus where a chair in which plaintiff
sat collapsed, having been procured for her by a clerk of defendant, it
22
was held that the customer had a prima facie case against the store. *
Likewise in the case of Clark-Daniels, Inc. v. Deathe et al.23* it was
held that res ipsa loquitur was in order where a chair in which plaintiff
was sitting collapsed because of the absence of a vital screw. It is sub= Ibid.
Burckhalter et al. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 340 Pa. 300, 16 A. (2d) 716
(1941).
2-,*
Sherlock v. Strouss-Hirshberg Co., 132 Ohio St. 35, 4 N. E. (2d) 912
(1936) (The court was of opinion that this stool was not within the exclusive control of defendant, and that it could have been placed in this position by some of
the customers as easily as by an employee of defendant.).
J0* Barnes v. J. C. Penny Co., 190 Wash. 633, 70 P. (2d)
311 (1937) (It is
necessary for the injured party to prove that the instrumentality causing the injury was, at the time thereof, in the exclusive control of defendant.).
' 42 Cal. App. (2d) 38, 108 P. (2d) 36, 39 (1940).
1852 R. I. 151, 158 Atl. 720 (1932).
"0*Accord, Mineo v. Rand's Food Shops, Inc., Misc.-, 32 N. Y. S. (2d)
23 (1941) (Court conceded that defendant was constructively in control of the chair,
but said that there should be exclusive control. There was also the feeling on
the part of the court that defendant had only limited opportunity for inspection.).
- Herries v. Bond Stores, 231 Mo. App. 1053, 84 S.W. (2d) 153 (1935).
"1Clark-Daniels, Inc. v. Deathe et al.,
131 S. W. (2d) 1091 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939).
2* Supra note 19 (The court distinguishes between this and the Kilgore case,
which was stated to be in a minority, in that the clerk in the former case offered
the chair to plaintiff, while in the latter case there was no clerk present and the
plaintiff moved the chair six inches and sat down.).
.3,
Supra note 20 (The court attempts to distinguish this from the Kilgore
case by stating that in the former there was a defect not apparent to the casual
observer, while in the latter such was not the case.).
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mitted that the proposition expounded in the latter decisions is more
reasonable, for the storekeeper has an "overall" control of chairs provided for his customers and he could have discovered any defects by
reasonable inspection; whereas the injured customer was not in a position to inspect for hidden defects.
The application of the doctrine would seem to be clear in those cases
involving injuries sustained by falling objects. It is usually held that
res ipsa loquitur is available when the object is within the control of
defendant and would likely not have fallen had there been due care
24
exercised by the latter. Thus in Benjamin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
plaintiff was permitted to invoke the doctrine where he was injured by
a falling advertising sign which had been resting on a narrow ledge
over a stairway. 25* Closely allied to this situation and presenting a
striking analogy is the case of Nichols v. Korbritz.26

There plaintiff,

while standing in the center of the store, was struck in the eye by a
meat hook which, for some unexplained reason, had traveled from an
open refrigerator along a track on the ceiling extending into the center
of the store. The court said that, since this instrumentality was within
the control of the defendant and the injury would not likely have hap27
pened had the latter exercised due care, res ipsa loquitur applied.
Likewise where a customer falls through a defective trap door, not hav29
28
ing been apprised of its presence, or an unguarded cellar stairway,
the doctrine has found favor with the courts.
The principal case seems to be one of first impression, but upon
analogy and comparison with the prerequisites for the application of
the doctrine and with those cases which immediately follow dealing with
swinging doors, it is apparent that the North Carolina court reached
the logical result. In a recent Illinois case3" the plaintiff's intestate was
about to enter defendant's store through a swinging door which was
partially open. When she came within one foot of the entrance the
door swung towards her, and in an effort to ward off a certain collision
therewith, she lost her balance and fell. The evidence tended to show
that several other persons had preceded intestate and had gone through
this same door, accounting for its being partially open at this time. It
was held that res ipsa loquitur did not apply. This case is representative of those where the injured party or some third person in fact
-462 Ohio App. 83, 23 N. E. (2d) 447 (1939).
, 63 S. W. (2d) 296
Mo. App. * Accord, Perry v. Stein et al., (1933) (Where a shelf in a store collapsed throwing canned goods on plaintiff.) ;
2

Gailbraith v. Smith, 120 N. J. L. 515, 1 A. (2d) 34 (1938) (Chandelier fell on
plaintiff.).
' 139 Me. 256, 29 A. (2d) 161 (1942).
27 Ibid.
"8 John v. McGinnis Co., 37 Cal. App. (2d) 176, 99 P. (2d) 323 (1940).
Misc. -,
17 N. Y. S. (2d) 337 (1939).
2" Lynch et al. v. Gatteguo, -

" Todd v. S. S. Kresge Co., 303 Ill. App. 89, 24 N. E. (2d) 899 (1940).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

had control of the agency, and the accident might have resulted from
one of several causes, for some of which the defendant would not be
liable 3 1* When a customer places himself within range of a swinging
door, he subjects himself to the probability of being hit by it if someone
has just passed through it. It would be unreasonable to conclude that
the storekeeper was in exclusive control of such an instrumentality.
The reasoning of these cases apl)lies to the facts of the recent North
Carolina case.3 2 Could it be fairly said that the storekeeper in the instant case was in exclusive control of the opening and closing of the
"magic eye" door, when such door is known to remain motionless until
the light beam between the electric eyes (which cause the door to operate) is broken by an incoming or outgoing patron? The ptoposition
expressed in the swinging door cases above, i.e., that third persons are
in control of the door rather than defendant, would seem to apply to
cases of doors operated by the magic eye.
In the instant case a railing separated ingoing and outgoing customers. The right hand door was marked "IN" and there was a rope
on the outside of the left hand door to indicate that it was not the entrance. The plaintiff's carelessness in not keeping to the right and
using the door marked entrance presents an inference of negligence
which would also preclude the application of the doctrine. It is submitted that the Supreme Court reached the correct result.
JAMES G. HuDsoN, JR.
Wills-Acts Constituting Election
In the recent case of Perkins v. Isley' testatrix devised all her property to defendant and appointed plaintiff as executor. Plaintiff was
declared mentally incompetent, and defendant requested the clerk of
court to appoint an administrator c. t. a. The administrator was ap31* Olson v. Swan, 203 Cal. 206, 263 Pac. 518, 58 A. L. R. 129 (1928) (The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable in case of injury to a patron of a
store by the rebound of a swinging door when she was holding its companion open
for another customer to pass through, where the equipment is standard and includes checking devices.); Home Public Market v. Newrock, 111 Colo. 428, 142
P. (2d) 272 (1943) (Plaintiff was injured by the breaking of a glass panel in
swinging door under pressure of his hand.) ; Wiedanz v. May Dept. Store Co.,
Mo. App. - , 156 S. W. (2d) 44 (1941) (Where plaintiff, attempting to
enter defendant's store through revolving door, was knocked down by a woman
hit by the door which was pushed by a man, it was held that there was no proximate cause as to the defendant.) ; Farina v. First Nat. Bk., 72 Ohio App. 109, 51
N. E. (2d) 36 (1943) (Patron departing from bank was injured by collapse of
revolving door. It was held that res ipsa loquiltur did not apply.). But cf. Crump
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 313 Ill. App. 151, 39 N. E. (2d) 411 (1942)
(The store's door was equipped with a plunger door check, and plaintiff was struck
by the metal bar of the door which had been held open by the door stop but suddenly closed as customer entered the store. it was held that res ipsa loquitur was
applicable.).
" Supra note 1.
1224 N. C. 793, 32 S. E. (2d) 588 (1945).

